Quantum mechanics traditionally places the observer 'outside' of the system being studied and employs the Born interpretation. In this and related papers the observer is placed 'inside' the system. To accomplish this, special rules are required to engage and interpret the Schrödinger solutions in individual measurements. The rules in this paper (called the nuRules) do not include the Born rule that connects probability with square modulus.
Introduction
The method of this paper differs from the traditional quantum mechanical theory of measurement (Copenhagen, von Neumann, etc.) in that it sees the observer in an ontological rather than an epistemological context. Traditional quantum theory places the observer outside of the system where operators and/or operations are used to obtain information about the system. This is the epistemological model shown in fig. 1 .
The large OP in fig. 1 might be a mathematical 'operator' or a corresponding physical 'operation'. The observer makes a measurement by choosing a formal operator that is associated with a chosen laboratory operation. As a result, the observer is forever outside of the observed system -making operational choices. The observer is forced to act apart from the system as one who poses theoretical and experimental questions to the system. This model is both useful and epistemologically sound. However, the special rules developed in this paper apply to the system by itself, independent of the possibility that an observer may be inside, and disregarding everything on the outside. This is the ontological model shown in fig. 2 . A measurement occurring inside this system is not represented by a formal operator. Rather, it is represented by a measuring device that is itself part of the system. If the sub-system being measured is S and a detector is D, then a measurement interaction is given by the entanglement Φ = SD. If an observer joins the system in order to look at the detector, then the system state becomes Φ = SDB, where B is the brain state of the observer.
The system May or may not include observer
The ontological model is able to place the observer inside the universe of things and give a full account of his conscious experience there. It is a more realistic view of the relationship between the observer and the rest of the universe inasmuch as a conscious observer is always 'in principle' includable in a wider system. The ontological approach taken here represents a considerable departure from the traditional theory of measurement; for among other things, it rejects the Born interpretation of quantum mechanics. In place of the Born rule, special rules like the nuRules of this paper allow physics to unambiguously predict the sequential experience of an observer in the system.
It is valid to use either the epistemological model or the ontological model when the observer is not in the system. Quantum mechanical measurement is sometimes said to refer to ensembles of observations but not to individual observations. In this paper we propose a set of four special rules that apply to individual measurements in the ontological model. They are called nuRules (1-4), and do not include the long-standing Born interpretation of quantum mechanics. Instead, probability is introduced (only) through the notion of probability current. These rules can describe a quantum mechanical state reduction (i.e., stochastic reduction or collapse) that is associated with either an 'observer' type measurement, or an 'objective' type measurement. The former occurs only in the presence of an observer, whereas the latter takes place independent of an observer. The nuRules are demonstrated below in several different physical situations. I claim that they are a consistent and complete set of rules that can give an ontological description of any individual measurement or interaction in quantum mechanics. NuRules also appear in a previous paper [1] .
These rules are not themselves a formal theory of measurement. I make no attempt to understand why they work, but strive only to insure that they do work. They accurately describe one's conscious experience of measuring instruments in an ontological setting, while preserving the essentials of Schrödinger's mechanics. Presumably, a formal theory can one day be found to explain these rules in the same way that atomic theory explains the empirically discovered rules of atomic spectra, or in the way that current theories of measurement aspire to merge with standard quantum mechanics or to make the neurological connection with observers.
Another Rule-Set
Other papers [2, 3] propose another rule-set called the onuRules (1-4). The "o" means that they are the same as the nuRules except that the basis states of a reduction are confined to observer states. In ref. 3 they are called simply rules (1-4). I have changed their name to onuRules in order to clarify their relationship to the nuRules. Like the nuRules, they introduce probability through the notion of 'probability current' rather than 'square modulus'; however, onuRule measurements are possible only when an observer is present. In addition, both rule-sets introduce ready states that define the basis states of reduction. The properties of the nuRule ready states are described below.
We consider two sets of rules in the ontological model. They both use 'ready' states. In the onuRule case these are limited to ready brain states. Only the first rule-set supports the idea that measurement depends on the presence of an observer.
nuRules ( 2, 3 ). These rule-sets are distinguished by the properties listed above, and by the placement of observers inside of an ontological system for the purpose of making continuous observations. Observations are not restricted to a 'given moment of time' as when one uses the epistemological model and the Born rule.
Purpose of Rule-Sets
It is possible to have an empirical science using the epistemological model without explicitly talking about consciousness. This is because it is always assumed that the outside observer is conscious, so there is no need to make a theoretical point of it.
However, in the ontological model, everything that exists is in principle included in the system. So if quantum mechanics is to be an empirical science, then the system must provide for the existence of conscious brains that can make empirical observations. This means that the theory must be told when and how conscious brain states appear so that an empirical science is possible within the model. Special rules like one of the above rule-sets are required for this purpose.
I emphasize again that these rule-sets are not alternative theories that seek to replace the formalism of von Neumann. Each is more like an empirical formula that requires a wider theoretical framework in order to be understood -a framework that is presently unknown. I do not finally choose one of the rule-sets or propose an explanatory theory. I am only concerned here with the ways in which an individual state reduction might work in an ontological model, consistent with various possible assumptions.
The Interaction: Particle and Detector
Before introducing an observer into this ontological model, consider an interacting particle and detector system by itself. These two objects are assumed to be initially independent and given by the equation
where ψ i is the initial particle state and d i is the initial detector state. The particle is then allowed to pass over the detector, where the two interact with a cross section that may or may not result in a capture. After the interaction begins at a time t 0 , the state is an entanglement in which the particle variables and the detector variables are not separable. However, we let Φ(t ≥ t 0 ) be in a representation whose components can be grouped so that the first includes the detector d 0 in its ground state prior to capture, and subsequent components include the detector in various states of capture given by d w , d int , and d d .
where d w (t) represents the detector immediately after a capture when only the window side of the detector is affected by the event, and d d (t) represents the detector when the result of a capture has worked its way through to the display side of the detector. The intermediate state d int (t) represents the detector during stages in between, when the effects of the capture have found their way into the interior of the detector but not as far as the display.
There is a clear discontinuity or "quantum jump" between the two components d 0 and d w at the detector's window interface. This discontinuity is represented by a "plus" sign and involves a stochastic choice. The remaining evolution from d w to d d (t) is represented by arrows, and is continuous and classical. This continuous change is contained in a single component that develops in time, and may be represented by the
Since the detector is macroscopic, we may approximate d 0 in the first component to be a constant that is factored out of its entanglement with the particle. The capture state d 1 (t) in eq. 3 is equal to zero at t 0 and increases with time 1 .
ψ(t) is a free particle as a function of time, including all the incoming and scattered components. It does no harm and it is convenient to let ψ(t) carry 1 Each component in eq. 2 has an attached environmental term E 0 and E 1 . These are orthogonal, insuring local decoherence. The equation appears to be a mixture because these terms are not shown. However, eq. 2 (including the environmental terms) and others like it are fully coherent superpositions. In the following we will call them 'superpositions', reflecting their global rather than their local properties.
the total time dependence of the first component, and to let d 0 be normalized throughout 2 .
The first component in eq. 3 is a superposition of all possible scattered waves of ψ(t) in product with all possible recoil states of the ground state detector, so d 0 is a spread of states including all the recoil possibilities. The second component is also a superposition of this kind. It includes all of the recoil components of the detector that have captured the particle. In addition, there are other components of these states arising from the quantum mechanical uncertainties that exist within the detector. These are ignored in this treatment because of the macroscopic nature of the detector.
Add an Observer
Assume that an observer is looking at the detector in eq. 1 from the beginning.
where B i is the observer's initial brain state which is entangled with the detector D i . The detector is understood to include only higher order brain parts -that is, the physiology that is directly associated with consciousness after all image processing is complete. All lower order physiology leading to B i is assumed to be part of the detector. The detector is now represented by a capital D, indicating that it includes the bare detector by itself plus the low-level physiology of the observer.
Following the interaction between the particle and the detector, we have
where B 0 is the observer's brain when the detector is observed to be in its ground state D 0 , and B 1 is the brain when the detector is observed (at the display end) to be in its capture state D 1 . Since the detector now includes the low-level physiology of the observer's brain, the display end of the detector D d is the interface between the low-level and upper-level physiology. As before, a discontinuous quantum jump is represented by a plus sign, and a continuous classical evolution is represented by an arrow. If the interaction is long lived compared to the time it takes for the signal to travel through the detector in eq. 4, then the superposition in that equation will generally exist for some time before a stochastic choice causes a state reduction. This means that there can be two active brain states of this observer in superposition, where one sees the detector in its ground state and the other sees the detector in its capture state. Equation 4 therefore invites a paradoxical interpretation like that associated with Schrödinger's cat. This ambiguity cannot be allowed. The nuRules of this paper must not only provide for a stochastic trigger that gives rise to a state reduction, and describe that reduction, they must also insure than an empirical ambiguity of this kind will not occur.
The First Three NuRules
The first rule establishes the existence of a stochastic trigger. This is a property of the system that has nothing to do with the kind of interaction taking place or its representation. Apart from making a choice, the trigger by itself has no effect on anything. It initiates a state reduction only when it is combined with nuRules 2 and 3.
nuRule (1): For any subsystem of n components in an isolated system having a square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of one of those components at time t is given by (Σ n J n )/s, where the net probability current J n going into the n th component at that time is positive.
The second rule specifies the conditions under which ready states appear in solutions of Schrödinger's equation. These are understood to be the basis states of a state reduction.
nuRule (2): If an interaction gives rise to decoherent components that are discontinuous with the old components or with each other, then all newly created states in these new components will be ready states [note: Although solutions to Schrödinger equation change continuously in time, they can be "discontinuous" in other variables -e.g., the separation between the n th and the (n + 1) th orbit of an atom with no orbits in between. Of course, atomic states are coherent, but a discontinuity can also exist between macroscopic states that are decoherent 3 . For instance, the displaced detector states nuRule (3): If a component containing ready states is stochastically chosen, then all those states will become realized, and all other components in the superposition will be immediately reduced to zero.
[note: The claim of an immediate (i.e., discontinuous) reduction is the simplest possible way of describing the collapse of the state function. The collapse is brought about by an instantaneous change in the boundary conditions of the Schrödinger equation, rather than by the introduction of a new 'continuous' mechanism of some kind. A continuous modification can be added later (with a modification of nuRule 3) if that is seen to be necessary
4 .]
[note: This collapse does not generally preserve normalization. That does not alter probability in subsequent reductions because of the way probability per unit time is defined in nuRule (1) -that is, divided by the total square modulus.]
If an interaction does not produce decoherent components that are discontinuous with the old ones or with each other, then the Hamiltonian will develop the state in the usual way, independent of these rules. If the stochastic trigger selects a component that does not contain ready states, then there will be no nuRule (3) state reduction.
when a covering theory is found, it will provide a more definite qualifier for the appearance of ready states. 4 The new boundary comes from a stochastic hit on one of the available eigenvalues, which is the new boundary. The stochastic trigger is intrinsically discontinuous, and imposes that discontinuity on the developing wave function. This is the simplest way to account for the sudden change that takes place, and it spares our having to explain where a collapse producing continuous mechanism 'comes from'.
NuRule (4)
NuRule (4) is a selection rule that forbids transitions between ready states. Ready states disable transitions to ready states in other components, and transitions that produce a continuous evolution of the same component.
nuRule (4): Probability current may not flow between entanglements that contain ready states of the same object.
Apply to Interaction
When these rules are applied to the first row of eq. 4, we have just the first two components
where the second component D w (t)B 0 contains ready states (underlined) by virtue of nuRule (2), so it cannot pass current along to D int (t)B 0 because of nuRule (4). Since there is only one brain state in this superposition, a cat-like ambiguity is avoided. Equation 5 now replaces eq. 4. Equation 5 is the state of the system before there is a stochastic hit that produces a state reduction. The observer is here consciously aware of the detector in its ground state D 0 , for the associated brain state is correlated with both D 0 and D w . If there is a capture, then there will be a stochastic hit on the second component in eq. 5 at a time t sc . This will reduce the first component to zero according to nuRule (3), and convert the ready states in the second component to realized states.
The observer is still conscious of the ground state in this equation because the capture has only affected the window end of the detector. But after t sc a continuous evolution will produce
The states associated with the second and third components in eq. 6 are not ready states because they are not discontinuous with D w (t)B 0 or with each other as required by nuRule (2) . Therefore, the subsequent classical evolution will carry the system into a conscious awareness of the capture because of B 1 in the third component. Since eq. 6 represents a single component that evolves in time as shown, there is no time at which both B 0 and B 1 appear simultaneously in that equation. There is therefore no cat-like ambiguity in eq. 6.
Standard quantum mechanics (without these rules) gives us eq. 4 by the same logic that it gives us Schrödinger's cat and Everett's many worlds. Equation 4 (top or bottom row) is a single equation that simultaneously presents two different conscious brain states, resulting in an unacceptable ambiguity. However with these nuRules in effect the Schrödinger solution is properly grounded in observation, allowing the rules to correctly and unambiguously predict the experience of the observer. This is accomplished by replacing 'one' equation in eq. 4 with 'two' equations in eqs. 5 and 6. Equation 5 describes the state of the system before capture, and eq. 6 describes the state of the system after capture. Before and after are two different solutions to Schrödinger's equation, specified by different boundary conditions. Remember, we said that the stochastic trigger selects the (additional) boundary that applies to the reduced state. So it is the stochastic event that separates the two solutions -defining before and after.
A Terminal Observation
An observer who is inside a system must be able to confirm the validity of the Born Rule that is normally applied from the outside. To show this, suppose our observer is not aware of the detector during the interaction with the particle in eq. 3, but he looks at the detector after the interaction is complete. He observes at a time t ob > t f , where t f is the time of completion. During the interaction we have
where X is the unknown brain state of the observer prior to the physiological interaction 5 .
Assume there has not been a capture. Then after the interaction is complete and before the observer looks at the detector we have
where there is no longer a probability current flow inside the brackets. When the observer finally looks at the detector at t look we will have
where the physiological process (represented by the arrow) carries ⊗X into Although the observer cannot distinguish between the D 0 and D 1 in eq. 7, at some moment t ob he will resolve the difference between them, and when that happens a continuous 'classical' evolution will no longer be possible. The solution will then apparently branch into two components that separately recognize D 0 B 0 and D 1 B 1 .
However, current cannot flow into the fourth component from the second components because of nuRule (4), and current does not flow horizontally. Furthermore, current cannot flow into the fourth component from the first component because the Hamiltonian does not provide for it. This means that the fourth component in eq. 8 remains equal to zero. But then nuRule (2) does not require the third component to include ready states. Failing that requirement, the Hamiltonian will carry the component ψ ′ (t)D 0 B b into ψ(t)D 0 B 0 by a continuous classical process. In addition, the second component in eq. 8 can be ignored at this point since current cannot flow into it or out of it, and since it does not contain a conscious brain state. In these circumstances D 1 (t f )B b is called a phantom component and is ignorable 6 . Therefore, the solution generated by the physiological interaction is really
instead of eq. 8, so the observer comes on board to witness the detector in its ground state as he should. The probability of that happening is proportional to the square modulus of ψ(t)d 0 ⊗ X in eq. 7. If the particle is captured during the primary interaction, then after the interaction is complete and before the observer looks, we will have Φ(t ≥ t f > t 0 ) = d 1 ⊗ X. When the observer does finally look
Phantom components serve no physical purpose since square modulus has no physical significance in this treatment. Phantoms are reduced to zero whenever another component is stochastically chosen.
and when the observation is complete
So the observer comes on board to witness the detector in its capture state with a probability equal to the square modulus of d 1 (t f ) ⊗ X in eq. 7. The nuRules therefore confirm the Born Rule.
An Intermediate Case
In eq. 5 the observer is assumed to interact with the detector from the beginning. Suppose that the incoming particle results from a long half-life decay, and that the observer's physiological interactions begins in the middle of that interaction. We have
where again X is the unknown brain state of the observer prior to the physiological interaction. Primary probability current flows between the detector components (inside the brackets) as in eq. 3. Let the observer interact with the detector at some time t look giving
where the physiological process (represented by the arrow) carries ⊗X into B b , d 0 into D 0 , and d 1 into D 1 by a continuous classical progression leading from independence to entanglement. Again, the state B b is understood to be an inactive brain state on the brink of becoming active. As before, a resolution occurs at time t ob apparently leading to
However, current cannot flow into the fourth component from the second or third components because of nuRule(4), and current cannot flow into the fourth component from the first component because the Hamiltonian does not provide for it. This means that the fourth component in eq. 9 remains equal to zero. But then nuRule (2) does not require the third component to include ready states. As before, failing that requirement, the Hamiltonian will carry the first component ψ(t)D 0 B b into ψ(t)D 0 B 0 by a continuous classical process. Therefore, the solution generated by the physiological interaction is really
instead of eq. 9. The second component D 1 (t)B 1 is not the fourth component of eq. 9. It is a result of the primary interaction, and only rises above zero when ψ(t)D 0 B 0 in the bracket has been reached.
During the time between t look and t ob , a stochastic hit on the third component D ′ 1 (t)B b of eq. 10 is possible at a time t sc3 , yielding
where B i is whatever inactive brain state exists at the time t sc3 of the stochastic hit. The brain then executes the classical progression to consciousness (B i → B b → B 1 ) as required by the Hamiltonian, giving finally
After t ob in eq. 10 there are two possible stochastic hits that may occur, one on the second component D 1 (t)B 1 , and the other on the third component D
The first possibility can only occur after B 0 appears in the bracket of eq. 10. At that point D 1 (t)B 1 might be stochastically chosen at t sc2 giving
skipping t look . This corresponds to the observer coming on board (classically) before the capture, and then witnessing the capture at t sc2 . If the third component in eq. 10 is stochastically chosen at a time t sc3 ′ > t ob , then because the collapse reduces all other components to zero, the surviving brain state B b will classically become B 1 without going first to ready states.
This corresponds to the unlikely possibility that a capture occurs after the active physiological interaction has begun, but before it is complete. If there is no capture resulting from a stochastic hit in eq. 10, then the observer will remain conscious of D 0 , and every other component will become a phantom. This effectively leaves
Equation 11 is the result of a particle capture between t look and t ob . After t ob the two possibilities are eqs. 12 and 13. All these captures yield the same final state D 1 B 1 arrived at by a different route.
A Second Observer
If a second observer is standing by while the first observer interacts with the detector during the primary interaction, the state function will be
where X is an unknown state of the second observer prior to his interacting with the system. The detector D here includes the low-level physiology of the first observer. A further expansion of the detector will include the second observer's low-level physiology when he comes on board. When a product of brain states appears in the form BB or B ⊗ X, the first term will refer to the first observer and the second to the second observer.
The result of the second observer looking at the detector will be the same as that found for the first observer in the previous section, except that the first observer will be present in each case. In particular, the equations similar to eqs. 11, 12, and 13 are now
These captures all yield the same result. In no case will the nuRules produce a result like B 1 B 2 or B 2 B 1 .
Anomaly Avoided
NuRule (4) avoids a catastrophic anomaly if the primary interaction is complete at t f without a capture, before the second observer looks at the detector.
Assume that nuRule (4) is not in effect. Then when the second observer has observed the detector at t ob we will have
where the second row is zero at t ob and increases in time. The primary interaction is already complete in this equation, so there is no horizontal current flow. Without nuRule (4) the fourth component D ′ 1 (t f )B 1 B 1 in eq. 14 will be accessible to current from the second component. A stochastic hit at some time t sc4 would then be possible, yielding
This says that even though the first observer can testify that the interaction has been completed without a capture, both observers will experience a capture when the second observer comes on board -some time after the interaction is completed. That is absurd. NuRule (4) therefore plays the essential role in preventing absurdities of this kind.
In the previous sections we have seen how the nuRules go about including observers inside a system in an ontological model. The rules describe when and how the observer becomes conscious of measuring instruments; and furthermore, they replicate common empirical experience in these situations. In the next few sections we turn attention to another problem -the requirement that observed macroscopic states must appear in their normal sequence. This sequencing chore represents a major application of nuRule (4) that is illustrated in the case of a macroscopic counter.
A Counter
If a beta counter that is exposed to a radioactive source is turned on at time t 0 , its state function will be given by
where the components following C 0 (t) are zero at t 0 . C 0 is a counter that reads zero counts, C 1 reads one count, and C 2 reads two counts, etc. The underlined states are the ready states required by nuRule (2) . A parenthesis around a plus sign means that probability current cannot flow between those components because of nuRule (4); so the 0 th and the 1 st components are the only ones that are actively involved before there is a stochastic hit of any kind. Before that time, the only current flow will be J 01 from the 0 th to the 1 st component. The resulting distribution at some time t < t sc is shown in fig. 3 , where t sc is the time of a stochastic hit on the second component. (1) that requires that the probability per unit time is given by the current flow J 12 divided by the total square modulus at that moment. The total integral J 12 is less than 1.0 in the middle diagram of fig. 4 , but it is restored to 1.0 when divided by the total square modulus. It is therefore certain that the 2 nd component will be chosen. With nuRule (4) in place, probability current cannot initially flow from either of the intermediate states to the final state, for that would carry a ready state into another ready state of the same object. The dashed lines in fig. 5 indicate the forbidden transitions. But once the state A l (or A r ) has been stochastically chosen, it will become a realized state A l (or A r ) and a subsequent transition to A f can occur that realizes A f . The result of nuRule (4) is therefore to force the system into the familiar sequence that goes either clockwise or counterclockwise.
Grounding the Schrödinger Solutions
Standard quantum mechanics is not completely grounded in observation inasmuch as it does not include an observer. The epistemological approach of Copenhagen (formalized by von Neumann) does not give the observer a role that is sufficient for him to realize the full empirical potential of the theory; and as a result, this model encourages bizarre speculations such as the many-world interpretation of Everett or the cat paradox of Schrödinger. However, when the rules are written to allow a conscious observer to be given an ontologically complete role in the system, these empirical distortions disappear. It is only because of the incompleteness of the epistemological model by itself that these fanciful excursions seem plausible.
The nuRules avoid these paradoxical multi-conscious systems, for when a system collapses, the single surviving component may include a conscious brain state. If it does, then any components containing brain states that follow in a subsequent interaction will first involve a detector's ready state that cannot pass current along to the brain state until it is itself stochastically chosen. This guarantees that there can only be one conscious brain state at a time, so all paradoxical multi-conscious solutions are avoided.
Status of the Rules
No attempt has been made to relate conscious brain states or ready brain states to particular neurological configurations. The nuRules are an empirically discovered set of macro-relationships that exist on another level than micro-physiology, and there is no need to connect these two domains. These rules preside over physiological detail in the same way that thermodynamics presides over molecular detail. It is desirable to eventually connect these domains as thermodynamics is now connected to molecular motion; and hopefully, this is what a covering theory will do. But for the present we are left to investigate the rules by themselves without the benefit of a wider theoretical understanding. There are two rule-sets of this kind, the nuRules of this paper plus the onuRules in refs. 2 and 3.
There are four features that distinguish the two rule-sets from standard quantum mechanics. 1. They both work inside the ontological model. The epistemological format of standard quantum mechanics is too limited a view of the universe, and places a wrong emphasis on the role of the observer in physics. 2. Both rule-sets disavow the Born interpretation. Standard quantum mechanics has confined itself to the Born interpretation. These rule-sets open up another possibility that ought to be considered. 3. Consciousness is included. Standard quantum mechanics does not include consciousness in the universe. It can describe physiological systems in as much detail as desired, but it stops there. It makes no statement about consciousness itself because it does not have the language for it. 4. The onuRules give observers a job to do. Not only do the onuRules include consciousness in the universe, but they also give the observer the job of establishing boundary conditions. When making a measurement, the presence of an observer realizes a single eigenvalue and drives the rest to zero, thus selecting a new boundary for the collapsed solution of Schrödinger's equation. The conscous observer therefore plays a dynamic role like everything else in physics, and does not just occupy a passive viewer's platform outside of nature.
The question is, which of these two rule-sets is correct (or most correct)? Without the availability of a wider theoretical structure or a discriminating observation, there is no way to tell. Current reduction theories may accommodate a conscious observer, but none are fully accepted. So the search goes on for an extension of quantum mechanics that is sufficiently comprehensive to cover both Processes I and II of von Neumann. I expect that any such theory will support one of the ontological rule-sets, so these rules might serve as a guide for the construction of a wider theory.
